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Recent technology advancements have enabled the development of small cheap satellites that can 
perform useful functions in the space environment. Currently, the only low cost option for getting these 
payloads into orbit is through ride share programs - small satellites awaiting the launch of a larger 
satellite, and then riding along on the same launcher. As a result, these small satellite customers await 
primary payload launches and a backlog exists. An alternative option would be dedicated nano-launch 
systems built and operated to provide more flexible launch services, higher availability, and affordable 
prices. The potential customer base that would drive requirements or support a business case includes 
commercial, academia, civil government and defense. Further, NASA technology investments could 
enable these alternative game changing options. 
 
With this context, in 2013 the Game Changing Development (GCD) program funded a NASA team to 
investigate the feasibility of dedicated nano-satellite launch systems with a recurring cost of less than $2 
million per launch for a 5 kg payload to low Earth orbit. The team products would include potential 
concepts, technologies and factors for enabling the ambitious cost goal, exploring the nature of the goal 
itself, and informing the GCD program technology investment decision making process. 
 
This paper provides an overview of the life cycle analysis effort that was conducted in 2013 by an 
inter-center NASA team. This effort included the development of reference nano-launch system concepts, 
developing analysis processes and models, establishing a basis for cost estimates (development, 
manufacturing and launch) suitable to the scale of the systems, and especially, understanding the 
relationship of potential game changing technologies to life cycle costs, as well as other factors, such as 
flights per year. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In February 2014, shortly after Phase I of the study documented here had concluded, the process began for 
deploying 28 cubesats from the International Space Station6. These satellites from Planet-Labs, a customer of the 
International Space Station (ISS) NanoRacks CubeSats program, are part of an emerging trend in space systems – 
small, but capable satellites filling a variety of needs. Private sector commercial business’s, academic and scientific 
needs, as well as government interests, NASA or defense, are discovering the potential of these “nanosats”, satellites 
of less than 10kg mass. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Japanese Kibo robotic arm on the International Space Station deploying Planet-Labs CubeSats 
 
In the summer of 2013, an inter-center, inter-agency assessment was sponsored by the NASA Space Technology 
Mission Directorate Game Changing program. The objectives were: 
 
 Identify primary cost drivers for small launch vehicles (nano-small payload class, 5-100 kg) 
 Identify technology and concept opportunities to significantly reduce launch cost 
 Determine feasibility of achieving goal of < $2 M per launch recurring cost for a dedicated launch capability 
 
The dollar goal was preliminary, a rough target, understanding that the assessment process would have many 
uncertainties, with the study emphasizing the direction for future technology investments by NASA that could benefit 
emerging nanolaunchers. These investments could assist the development of capabilities that would benefit NASA 
needs as well. Other options already exist for getting small satellites to low Earth orbit (LEO), mainly ride share 
programs, meaning nanosats being carried along as secondary payloads when launching primary payloads. And while 
current rideshare launch prices are attractive to nanosat customers, the long contract-to-launch times (nominally 18 
months) and inherent constraints on orbital destinations are not. This proposed alternative approach is dedicated 
nano-satellite launch vehicles operated at an affordable price. 
 
2. Related Efforts 
 
One of the first steps in the nanolauncher technology assessment was a review of other related efforts. Many 
government, private sector and partnered initiatives are underway in this field of nanosats and nanolaunchers. The 
study was scoped to avoid any single point design, focusing on technology, affordability, and understanding the 
possibilities and drivers affecting target launch costs; this would distinguish this study from other related efforts. 
                                                          
6 Largest Flock of Earth-Imaging Satellites Launch into Orbit from Space Station, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/news/flock_1/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 
 3 
Related government funded nanolauncher efforts (in order of decreasing payload size) include: 
 
 The Super-Strypi program7 sponsored by the Defense department Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) office 
seeks to develop a launch system to exploit the 21st century range, including reduced infrastructure, using 
technology such as Automated Flight Safety Systems (AFSS), Global Positioning System (GPS) metric tracking, 
space-based telemetry relay, and automated flight planning. Performance goals are for a 300 kilogram payload 
to a 475 km orbit at 45 degree inclination. The affordability goal is a $12-15M “fly-away” price as a commercial 
launch service. 
 
 The Airborne-Launch Assist Space Access (ALASA) program sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA): “ALASA seeks to launch satellites on the order of 100 pounds (45 kilogram) for 
less than $1M total, including range support costs, to orbits that are selected specifically for each 100 pound 
payload8.” This nanolauncher point design in the trade space of options places special emphasis on moving the 
launcher away from traditional ground infrastructure, including launch site (especially “range”) requirements 
that have evolved around larger launchers with significantly higher revenue. It would be impossible for a 
nanolauncher to achieve a price of $1M a launch if payments to the launch site range alone were that amount. 
Additionally, meeting certain range requirements can create significant costs internal to a launcher organization, 
regardless of any payment (or reimbursable) to a range. In March 2014, Boeing was selected out of a three-way 
competition to demonstrate its concept9. 
 
 The Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer for Space (SWORDS) program sponsored by the 
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC): SWORDS is “…an initiative to develop a low 
cost, responsive and robust space launch system for the U.S. Army to quickly launch and deploy 
nanosatellites10.” Eventually the concept would “…launch 25 kilogram payload to 750-kilometer orbit with 
28.5 degrees inclination” for $1M a launch. This nanolauncher point design in the trade space of options lays 
special emphasis on the factor of manufacturing, parts costs, and systems complexity. “Ultra-low cost is 
achieved by careful selection and judicious application of commercial-grade materials and components, as 
opposed to traditional aerospace-grade components.” As of this writing, 2014 work is focused on certain ground 
systems and vehicle engine development. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A sampling of government funded 
nanolauncher initiatives – SWORDS (left), 
ORS/Super-Strypi (right).  
(Not to relative scales) 
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9 Boeing Targets 66 Percent Launch Cost Reduction with ALASA, 
http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/40023boeing-targets-66-percent-launch-cost-reduction-with-alasa  
(last visited May 19, 2014). 
10 SWORDS, http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/SWORDS.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014). 
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 NASA is also encouraging the nanolauncher market (supply) by awarding a commercial launch services contract 
(demand) to Generation Orbit. Generation Orbit Launch Services, Inc. (GO) was selected to launch a group of 
three 3U CubeSats to a 425 km orbit as an initial capability demonstration, potentially leading to additional 
launch contracts.  The launch will “provide a CubeSat-class launch via the NASA Launch Services Enabling 
eXploration and Technology (NEXT) contract.  NEXT is an element of a strategic initiative led by NASA’s 
Launch Services Program (LSP), focused on assuring long-term launch services while also promoting the 
continued evolution of the U.S. commercial space launch market.11” 
 
 The “Nano Launch 1200” program sponsored by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center: The “1200” refers to 
dollars in thousands. This project is focused on reducing “the cost of launching a small payload or nanosat (1-
10kg) to space”. Partnerships are critical in the approach, including the Air Force Research Laboratory on 
technology, NASA multi--center groups on avionics, Kennedy Space Center on ground operations and launch, 
and Goddard Space Flight Center on launch. 
 
There are numerous nanolauncher initiatives in the private sector as well (with varying degrees of government 
support, as a potential customer, or with some form of partnering). Entrants here and some features of their concepts 
include (in alphabetical order): 
 
US 
o Garvey Aerospace -propane/LOX, ground/rail launch 
o Interorbital -white fuming nitric acid (WFNA) / turpentine/furfuryl alcohol, ocean/ground (island/non-
Range) launch 
o Raytheon -solid, 4-stage, air launch, F-15 
o Scorpius (spinoff of Microcosm Inc.) -RP/LOX, pressure fed, ground launch 
o Space Propulsion Group (SPG) -paraffin/LOX 
 Partnered w. Generation Orbit, air-launch, LearJet 
 Partnered w. Premier Space Systems, air-launch, MIG-21 
o Whittinghill Aerospace -rubber/NOX, ground launch 
 
Suppliers 
o Orbitec –small liquid engines, provider to Garvey 
o Scorpius-composite tank technology 
o Ventions –potential avionics and small liquid engine provider 
 
Non-US 
o NorthStar Concept/Andoya Range, Norway, hybrid, to polar, in development 
 
Notably, in March 2014 the Interorbital Systems Common Propulsion Module Test Vehicle (CPM TV) launched 
on its maiden flight, demonstrating its 7,500-lb thrust engine, propelling the 1200-lb rocket to Mach 1+. “The 30-
foot long CPM TV rocket is a boiler-plate test version of the identical rocket units that will make up Interorbital's 
modular orbital launch systems.12” 
 
This large and diverse number of private sector initiatives will continue to inform NASA technology investments. 
The study undertaken in the summer of 2013, however, would address a broad trade space, to understand what truly 
drives costs and flight rate capability for nanolaunchers, and what technology and approaches, including technology 
investments and partnerships, could enable the sectors healthy and sustainable growth. 
 
                                                          
11 NASA press release, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/news/releases/2013/release-20130930.html  
(last visited May 19, 2014). 
12 Interorbital press release, http://www.interorbital.com/interorbital_03302014_018.htm (last visited May 19, 2014). 
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3. Nanosat Markets 
 
Having defined broad objectives and reviewed related efforts, a necessary step toward understanding potential 
nanolaunchers begins with understanding their customers, the market of nanosats of all kinds. Two important factors 
here appear to be price of entry and flexibility. In launch market parlance, a common metric of cost is “cost per 
kilogram”. While useful in the right contexts, transportation services to space cannot (yet) be procured by the pound. 
As an analogy, the entire bolt of cloth must be purchased, not just a yard. Nonetheless, team members were aware 
that smaller launcher size (measured by payload capability) would usually mean higher costs per kilogram.  
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Figure 3: A sampling of recent launch prices, from recent contracts of US launchers13. 
 
Visualizations of costs vs. scale to observe trends, as in Figure 3, are common. When plotting data this way, the 
nanolauncher cost objective could be taken as asking “does a point exist around 5 kilograms that does not exceed 
$200,000/kg”? Figure 3 would seem to indicate that extrapolating beyond Pegasus or Scout rockets would take a 
5kg payload into the general area of the cost objective – but improvements moving off the trend-line are required to 
meet the target costs. There is insufficient data in the very small payload scale range to draw a definite conclusion, or 
extrapolation, other than to see both potential and challenge. 
 
Similarly, points on Figure 3 that are well below the trend-line of the rest of the group could be taken as an 
indication of needed context. More fully “commercial” systems (serving more non-government customers) could end 
up far lower on a cost per kg intercept at very small payload scales. This big picture view shows both the scope of 
the challenge and the promise in considering the potential of technology and context for affordable, dedicated 
nanolaunchers. 
 
                                                          
13 The raw data for this figure (Excel format) is available upon request. Contact the author at edgar.zapata-1@nasa.gov.  
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This leads to specific customers in the market for a launcher (of any kind) for their smallsats. Currently, 
universities dominate the nanosat/cube-sat field. NASA is a principal player and market maker here, with its Cube-
Sat Launch Initiative (CSLI14). To date, most CSLI awards have been to universities. The private sector small-
sat/cube-sat field is also growing fast and even predicted to soon dominate the market15. This is as small-sats 
continue to offer an increasingly accessible, participatory technology. 
 
Notably, it’s impossible to determine the future shape or bounds of a small/nanosat market seeing such innovation 
and entrepreneurial initiative, while attracting capital reaching into the tens of millions16,17. Business cases are 
innovative as well, for example, where imagery may be a focus, but not the fundamental business case (the case may 
be analytics18). 
 
A key takeaway from the review of the nanosat market information, affecting this study, is the reasonableness of 
considering flight rates that could assist in achieving price objectives, while also clarifying the question – what’s in 
the cost objective? The objective of $1M-$2M a launch would be a marginal cost then, related to flight rate as 
follows: 
  
 Cost objective: Amortizing fixed yearly costs (make or launch) over all units for the year plus the variable costs 
for each unit (make or launch). This will also be referred to as the recurring launch cost. 
o Fixed yearly costs are not considered to be incurred all at once at the start of the year, but may be 
amortized over the rate of manufacture and launch.  
o Variable costs are those costs incurred directly because of the make or launch of that additional unit. 
o Amortization of upfront costs (e.g., development costs) is not included. 
 
Another market factor informing this study (especially cost objectives) would be the current options for launch 
available to nanosat customers. A benchmark on prices could be the SpaceX small satellite pricing goals of 
$200,000-325,000 for a PPOD (a Poly-PicoSatellite Orbital Deployer) and $4-5 million for an ESPA (an ELV 
(Expendable Launch Vehicle) Secondary Payload Adapter ring (which includes propulsion)19. 
 
Alternately, companies such as NanoRacks with research platforms permanently installed on the U.S. National 
Laboratory aboard the International Space Station can charge much less for a launch through orbital delivery service. 
NanoRacks charges “…by the 1U–a 4 inch by 4 inch by 4 inch educational payload (1U) can be as low as $30,000. 
A 2U is twice that. A 2U by 1U is three times that. Commercial payloads start at $60,000 per 1U.20” Charges are 
higher for non-US payloads. NanoRacks takes advantage of excess delivery capacity on cargo flights to the station to 
provide this service. Nonetheless, NanoRacks capability is currently limited by the rate of satellite deployments 
possible at the station. This gave rise once again to importance of flight rate going in to the study – breaking away 
from current launch service limitations and constraints – should competitive, dedicated nanolaunchers be realized. 
 
                                                          
14 NASA CubeSat Launch Initiative, http://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/home/CubeSats_initiative.html  
(last visited May 19, 2014). 
15 Dominic DePascuale, John Bradford, “Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment”, February 2013, 
http://www.sei.aero/eng/papers/uploads/archive/SpaceWorks_NanoMicrosat_Market_Feb2013.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014). 
16 Alex Konrad, “Billionaire Yuri Milner Just Poured Millions Into This Whiz Kid Satellite Startup,” Forbes, December 18, 
2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2013/12/18/planet-labs-raises-52-million/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 
17 Peter B de Selding, “Skybox Gets Creative To Raise Capital from Wary Investors”, SpaceNews, March 26, 2013 
 http://www.spacenews.com/130326skybox-gets-creative-to-raise-capital-from-wary-investors (last visited May 19, 2014). 
18 Planet Labs advertises it’s “analytics platform”, appearing to break away from a traditional imagery business case, where a 
“global sensing and analytics platform unlocks the ability to understand and respond to change at a local and global scale”. 
19 Dustin Doud, Brian Bjelde, Chritain Melbostad, Lauren Dryer, “Secondary Launch Services and Payload Hosting Aboard the 
Falcon and Dragon Product Lines”, August 15, 2012, http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/smallsat/2012/all2012/40/  (last visited May 
19, 2014). 
20 NanoRacks, http://nanoracks.com/resources/faq/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 
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For benchmark purposes, cost objectives of private sector dedicated nanolaunchers efforts (Raytheon21, 
Generation Orbit22) are at the million-dollar end of the range of prices, while other launchers (Interorbital) would be 
on the far lower end (as little as $12,500 per 1u cubesat; and selling “by the yard” 23). All of this would inform the 
study going forward. 
 
4.  Requirements 
 
Having reviewed goals, related government and private sector efforts, emerging nanosat markets, and current 
nanosat launch options, the study defined more specific requirements (Figure 4) for the dedicated nanolauncher 
trade space. In this short study the values that would be emphasized most would relate to payload (performance of 
the nanolauncher), costs, and flight rates. 
 
A follow-up study in 2014 will delve into more of the detailed requirements, especially how requirements interact 
with very specific technology investments, costs and flight rates. 
 
 
Figure 4: Top-level requirements established in the nanolauncher study. 
5. Assumptions  
 
A handful of assumptions were necessary for the study before models, tools and processes could explore the 
implications of the dedicated nanolauncher cost and payload goal. These assumptions were: 
 
 Payload capabilities would be maintained through vehicle resizing 
 Launcher would assume a Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD) for all cubesat accommodations 
o (These have deployed > 90% of all CubeSats to date; 100% of all CubeSats since 2006) 
                                                          
21 Turner Brinton, “Raytheon Developing $2M Small Sat Launcher To Fly Under Wing of F-15”, SpaceNews,  August 8, 2011,  
http://www.spacenews.com/article/raytheon-developing-2m-small-sat-launcher-fly-under-wing-f-15 (last visited May 19, 2014). 
22 NASA press release, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/news/releases/2013/release-20130930.html  
(last visited May 19, 2014). 
23 Interorbital, http://www.interorbital.com/interorbital_03302014_003.htm (last visited May 19, 2014). 
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 Launcher would assume standard payload accommodations as: 
o No services, no customizing 
o Akin to rideshare accommodations 
o No trickle charging, spot purging or driving cleanliness requirements 
 
6. Assessment Process: Data 
 
The assessment process required adapting existing models and tools, or developing these anew, capable of 
providing confidence for new concepts at the small scale of nanolaunchers. The process would also research and 
establish some baseline data for comparative purposes. This assortment of information would eventually include: 
 
 The old Scout rocket, performance, costs, lessons, yearly flight rate experience 
 Small solid motor data, performance, prices 
 Missile data, performance, prices, size of production lots 
 
The Scout rocket proved particularly useful in lending insight. As a relatively small launcher, the scale was not 
significantly far from the scale some nanolaunchers may head. Abundant data was available on financials, launches 
and the technical design, including its evolution over time. Adjusting for inflation Figure 5 shows how this 
traditional (business as usual), older system had performed over time. Data points shown are for individual years of 
operation. As expected, one feature of such data is the way fixed cost and variable cost concepts can be better 
understood when contrasting total yearly resources against the flight rates actually achieved. Together, total yearly 
fixed and total yearly variable costs would comprise any marginal cost per launch (total fixed + variable $ divided by 
flight rate). This would affect prices, capital, etc. in a private sector business case.  
 
A key takeaway would be the need for the study to assure fixed costs were properly addressed, and drivers or 
causes understood, as fixed cost could be a significant contributor to prices. 
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Figure 5: Scout rocket cost-performance trend. 
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Missiles data also provided somewhat of a sanity check going into the process of analyzing nanolauncher 
possibilities. As with the Scout data though, a healthy recognition of data shortcomings was required. Data may be 
old, biased, incomplete, ill-defined as to content, and so on, unless a more rigorous search (and access, such as to 
contracts) is undertaken. This may represent forward work. Missiles data nonetheless provided useful sanity checks 
in the nanolauncher assessment process. Asking if a Nano-Launcher can be had for $1M-$2M, to make and launch, 
is like asking if a solid rocket Surface-to-Air missile (SAM) of the same scale can be had while – 
 
 Avoiding a multi-billion dollar development cost (historical SAM’s) 
 Costing much less than $3-$4M a unit to manufacture (possibly having to cost significantly less as some SAMs 
exceed even these amounts). 
 Manufacturing in similar lot sizes (100 units) 
 Carrying less payload (possibly, vs. SAMs at 60kg) 
 Carrying only non-hazardous payloads 
 Deleting some requirements (ground based vs. sea-based launchers, storage, etc.) 
 Adding other requirements (flight termination systems (FTS) on some stages, etc.) 
 Meeting similar precision (but to orbit) 
 Breaking up the design/performance; having more stages 
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For comparison, a missile to scale alongside other launcher and a potential nanolauncher is shown in Figure 6. 
The reader should note that some nanolauncher efforts would fall into the SAM missile scale, while wanting to do so 
as relatively small businesses, and offering full “fly-away” prices (manufacturing plus operations and launch) well 
below what missile manufacturers charge only for manufacturing. Again, this informs the scale of the challenge as 
much as the scale of the systems to be analyzed. 
 
Raytheon 
SM-2
Nanolauncher
Scales
 
Figure 6: A sense of scale for nanolaunchers. 
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7. Assessment Process: Models 
 
Performance and cost assessment was accomplished iteratively as well as with some redundancy. Multiple cost 
models were deployed. This approach would assure that (1) sizing and performance were reasonable, (2) any 
weakness in any single cost model could be understood when comparing against other models, and (3) any results 
could be better supported, with more confidence. In its broad strokes, the specific models, process, and results are 
shown in Figure 7. Based on comparisons with historical small launch systems, such as Scout, initial questions that 
are asked are whether large reductions in recurring launch cost are achievable, while still meeting performance 
requirements, through a combination of reduced vehicle scale (resulting from payload downsizing) and increased 
flight rate. The models and tool set are used to answer these questions while also capturing the impacts of alternative 
technologies. 
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Figure 7: ACT, AML, SEER and the L-LCC model would yield some promising results on reference nanolauncher concept 
performance, but only moving beyond each reference, with the integration of new technology, and other technical and non-
technical factors, would it also appear promising that nanolaunchers also reach their low cost, high flight rate goals. 
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The models used in the assessment process included (in alphabetical order): 
 
 Affordability Comparison Tool (ACT): 
 
A prototype of the Affordability Comparison Tool (ACT)24 is able to provide insight into acquisition, operational, 
and lifecycle affordability for early concept formulation and systems analysis support (Figure 8). ACT analyzes 
different systems or architecture configurations that allows for a comparison of total lifecycle cost, annual 
affordability, cost per pound, cost per seat, cost per flight (average), and total payload mass throughput. Although 
ACT is not a deterministic model, it does use characteristics (parametric factors) of the architectures/systems being 
compared to produce important system outcomes (figures-of-merit) of different system configurations, as well as 
different business assumptions and system utilization scenarios. The ACT prototype has both spreadsheet and server-
based technologies and contains a set of algorithms that processes system configuration and characteristics to a 
measure of system affordability. Parametric factors are derived from quantifiable data about each system 
configuration's attributes. An initial algorithm converts quantifiable system configuration and characteristics data 
into a parametric factor on-the-fly for architecture/system complexity. The next set of ACT algorithms processes the 
complexity into system affordability figures-of-merit. These algorithms are initialized using known space 
transportation data to "anchor" embedded values in the algorithms. The algorithms allow the comparison of standard 
processes embedded with mathematically consistent values. This will not necessarily produce an exact forecast 
(deterministic cost number), but instead provide consistent figures-of-merit suitable for surfacing more affordable 
and productive systems and technology alternatives. ACT is scalable in that it can compare architectural design 
concepts of large scale systems (elements) down to subsystems and their differing technology content. Although the 
configuration of these systems may be vastly different, ACT can make functional comparisons based on multiple 
system attributes. 
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Figure 8: Schematic representation of the Affordability Comparison Tool (ACT) prototype. 
 
                                                          
24 Carey McCleskey, Timothy Bollo, Jerry Garcia, “Affordability Comparison Tool (ACT),” NASA Tech Briefs, February, 2014. 
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 IDEA/AML:  
 
IDEA (Integrated Design & Engineering Analysis)25 is a collaborative environment for parametrically modeling 
conceptual and preliminary launch vehicle configurations using the Adaptive Modeling Language® (AML™) as the 
underlying framework. The environment integrates geometry, configuration, propulsion, aerodynamics, 
aerothermodynamics, trajectory, closure and structural analysis into a generative, parametric, unified computational 
model where data is shared seamlessly between the different disciplines. IDEA has extensive development heritage 
and application within NASA Langley Research Center's Vehicle Analysis Branch toward reusable launch vehicle 
design, and in particular, toward hypersonic air-breathing based systems. Much was leveraged from prior 
development by AFRL of the IPAT system for the Reusable Military Launch System (RMLS) concept work. For the 
present application, a new IDEA "class" was derived to enable modeling of expendable multi-stage launch vehicles 
at this relatively small scale.  A number of mass estimating relationships (MERs) were developed that are applicable 
to this scale. Developing "rubberized" parametric solid motor modeling posed particular challenges. The IDEA 
environment is particularly well suited for performing system requirements sensitivities and/or technology trades 
given its parametric nature. IDEA provides the performance related metrics (mass, payload, trajectory, etc.) that are 
used as input to the life cycle analysis (cost, ops, etc.) predictions that are of ultimate interest.  
 
 
Figure 9: Sample screen of the Integrated Design & Engineering Analysis collaborative modeling environment.  
 
                                                          
25 J. Robinson, “An Overview of NASA’s Integrated Design and Engineering Analysis (IDEA) Environment (Unclassified)”, 
AIAA-2011-2392, April 2011. 
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 L-LCC:  
 
A new nanolauncher sub-model was created within the already existing ez-Launcher Life Cycle Cost model (L-
LCC26). The model integrates both technical and non-technical descriptive inputs – that is, the user selects from 
drop-downs to describe the rocket’s design as well as its non-technical context such as industry processes and 
practices. Development, manufacturing and operations/launch portions of a projects life cycle are all covered. 
Challenges here included scale as well as the applicability of many model relationships that had been developed 
originally with larger launch systems in mind. 
 
 SEER-H: 
 
A commercially available cost estimating suite, SEER for Hardware, Electronics & Systems (SEER-H27) was also 
used to develop an alternative costing look at development and production costs within the total life cycle of the 
nanolauncher design. The tool can be used in early stage development efforts to predict development and production 
costs, deterministically or probabilistically. Phase I efforts focused on the creation of a Scout-D cost model and a 4-
stage solid rocket motor nanolauncher cost model. The intent was to understand rate change effects using this tool 
and to determine component cost drivers limited to the design/production cost area. An initial Scout model 
composed of 111 hardware cost elements was created to understand these effects. The 15 element initial 4-stage 
solid rocket motor nanolauncher cost model serves as a placeholder as more detailed designs evolve, and the 
framework can guide research and design iterations towards realistic trades and identifying potential cost drivers. 
The limitation of the SEER-H model, as applied to this study, is a lack of estimation ability on launch operations and 
ground facility costing, which the other cost models (L-LCC and ACT) can address. 
 
Figure 10: A high-level schematic/description of the SEER-H model. 
 
                                                          
26 The ez-Launcher Life Cycle Cost (ez-L-LCC) model (Excel format) is available upon request. Contact the author at 
edgar.zapata-1@nasa.gov. 
27 SEER-H, http://www.galorath.com (last visited May 19, 2014). 
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8. Results 
 
The phase I nanolauncher assessment would focus on a 4-stage solid rocket “baseline” as shown in Figure 11. A 
“baseline” would be representative of that type of launch system. Design and technology assumptions were 
influenced by sounding rocket designs and the desire to baseline existing technologies. Results shown were 
generated using IDEA and are of a preliminary and conservative nature, with improvements expected as the 
modeling is matured and refined. 
 
 
Figure 11: Concept 1 baseline of the nanolauncher technology and life cycle assessment. 
 
Another nanolauncher “baseline” concept also defined during phase I was an all-liquid two-stage system as 
shown in Figure 12. Beyond the differences due to the liquid propulsion system, the concept had similar 
assumptions to Concept 1. Sizing for Concept 2 was done with simplified mass fraction techniques rather than the 
IDEA modeling and is of lower analysis fidelity than Concept 1. Vehicle Sketch Pad was utilized for the 
configuration layout shown. 
 
There are a number of consequences due to scaling down from EELV scale that affect the design of these very 
small launch vehicles. These include higher relative drag losses, higher flight loads that drive up structural mass, and 
increased dispersions from the desired flight profile that the upper stages will have to correct for. Higher drag losses 
will drive up the required propellant fraction to achieve orbit as compared to larger launch vehicles. Elaborating on 
some of these issues: 
 
1. Delta velocity losses due to aerodynamic drag increases inversely proportional to vehicle scale. This is due to 
the fact that drag is proportional to area or scale squared whereas available energy (propellant) is proportional to 
volume or scale cubed. So if you reduce launch vehicle scale to 10%, your drag loss will be .12/.13 = 10 times 
original. Typically, for EELV class launch vehicles, the drag loss is about 3%. Therefore for a one tenth scale 
launch vehicle, the drag loss would be about 30%. This requires increasing relative propellant loading 
(propellant fraction) or increasing the number of stages. 
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Figure 12: Concept 2 baseline of the nanolauncher technology and life cycle assessment. 
 
2. Normal (lateral) loading during assent also increases inversely proportional to vehicle scale. Given that normal 
load due to angle of attack or cross winds (winds aloft) are proportional to area or scale squared whereas vehicle 
mass is proportional to volume or scale cubed, the normal accelerations and therefore responses/loads increases 
inversely proportional to scale in a similar fashion as drag. This will drive up vehicle bending as well as lateral 
acceleration inertial loading. 
 
3. Solid rocket motor based vehicles incur additional impacts. Axial acceleration/load and maximum dynamic 
pressure increases inversely proportional to vehicle scale as well due to the fact that thrust is proportional to 
propellant burn surface area and vehicle mass is proportional to volume. Burn area is proportional to scale 
squared assuming the propellant grain pattern is the same. Axial acceleration is a function of thrust divided by 
vehicle mass. Dynamic pressure profile will essentially increase in proportion to axial acceleration. Dynamic 
pressure increase compounds the problem given that both drag and normal load is proportional to it, further 
increasing the propellant loading requirement and structural demands on the launch vehicle. Liquid rocket 
engine based designs inherently decouple the thruster sizing from the propellant mass allowing the thruster 
(engine) to be scaled independently and mitigate much of this effect. Typically, solid rocket motor based 
systems require more stages for these reasons. 
 
The combined set of models was applied, at times comparing one model’s results against another for added 
insight. The new, baseline concepts were “anchored” (but not limited) by the Scout reference data previously 
described (Figure 5). Knowing what total costs may have been (for historical references) or would have to be (for 
new concepts) still required seeing assessment results in light of what kind of costs arise and where these potential 
costs most arise. As seen in Figure 13, it is important that analysis, investments and efforts in this area pay attention 
to fixed costs, especially in production. 
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Figure 13: What kind of costs (fixed) and where (production) require attention in nanolauncher analysis. 
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Figure 14: Concept 1 (all-solid nanolauncher) breakout of results 
 
Along these lines, a breakout of results for the baseline, new concepts was derived, as shown in Figure 14. 
 
• Majority of recurring costs are accumulated in Nano-Launcher production 
• Fixed costs (production and operations together) are substantial 
• Streamlined practices reduce costs and can influence any of the recurring cost elements 
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Within the prior understanding, one of the broader results of the preliminary assessment is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Overall results of the preliminary nanolauncher assessment for solid and liquid propulsion options. 
 
There are some important caveats when thinking about how nanolauncher costs per flight vary with flight rate. 
The most important thing when reading such charts is to read them asking “if the flight rate were X, then what would 
approximate costs be per flight”. A company wanting to offer certain prices would have to assure enough orders, and 
an ability to fulfill those orders by producing enough flights, to keep costs per flight well below prices – to even 
begin to have numbers add up. Other considerations include: 
 
 The size of a company that would be dealing with million dollar launches, in a “what-if” of around 15 launches 
per year, might be as few as a hundred or so employees. Endless variations around these numbers can be 
calculated; perhaps more for labor, or less for materials, for labor rates that are average, or lower because of a 
more supplier driven concept, and so on. Nonetheless, the workforce numbers will hover around the range of 
this basic “what-if” when dealing with 10’s of launches and prices in the low million dollars range. 
 
 Fixed costs and variable costs, both of which contribute to marginal costs, are naturally linked to flight rate and 
the productivity of a workforce. Technology, design, and process steps in manufacturing and operations, will all 
affect the actual flight rate achievable with a given workforce. Figure 15 can be read many ways then. Since the 
teams cost assessment goal was relatively low, the results show promise for dedicated nanolaunchers if the 
combination of market (actual demand), flight rate capability (actual productivity), technology improvements, 
and costs all combine successfully near the lower right. 
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 Fixed costs should not be interpreted here in the traditional sense used in larger aerospace operations. Rather, it 
is assumed in the scenarios modeled that a company makes a commitment of resources that includes labor, 
facilities, equipment, materials and supplies, suppliers/relationships, etc. If no launches were produced, what 
would these costs add up to over a year? This would be akin to fixed costs. Separate these costs from costs that 
are more specific and additional due to an order for a launch, the variable costs. Figure 16 shows this 
separation, where eventually the marginal costs approach the variable costs (the burn rate of fixed costs now 
being divided, amortized, over so many customers.) 
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Figure 16: One scenario run of many when modeling the costs of potential nanolauncher configurations. 
 
9. Forward Work 
 
An assortment of forward work remains following this brief phase I nanolauncher technology and life cycle cost 
assessment. The work to date has delved into some detail in the configuration and performance of a class of 
nanolaunchers (using solid rocket motors). Work has begun on other classes of configurations (liquids, hybrids, etc.) 
Certain details of technology, design and technical factors have been related to costs (within certain contexts, factors 
about business-as-usual vs. new ways of doing business, commercial, etc.) 
 
Forward work in Phase II, based on feedback from sponsors and stakeholders, includes: 
 
 Analyzing the Phase I designs to a higher fidelity. 
 Refining life cycle cost methodologies and results. 
 Further exploring business case scenarios and market segments. 
 Determining the specific sensitivity of potential new technology to cost reductions (vs. no technology or 
baseline technology). Examples / candidates include: 
o Generic Application 
 Additive Manufacturing 
 Scalable Avionics (ex. Smart Phone-derived) 
 Rapid Robotic Stage Assembly 
 Advanced Work Flow and Supply Chain Technologies 
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 Commercial Aircraft-like Certification (vs Flight-by-Flight) 
 Adv Sys Engineering Processes & Tools Applied to Flight Certification Reviews 
 Rapid Mission Planning Tools 
 Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) 
 Low Cost Transporter, Erector Launchers (TELs) 
 Simple Fixed Launch Mounts 
 Rapid, Robotic Nano-Launcher Stage Integration 
 Out-of-Autoclave Composites vs. Conventional  
 Carbon nanotube reinforced tanks 
 Advanced green monopropellants 
o Solid-Propelled Vehicle Application 
 Advanced Solid Propellant Manufacturing & Casting 
 Pre-Segmented, Common Diameter Small Solid Motors 
 Fast Cure Solid Propellant Technologies 
  
Especially, forward work will focus on opportunities for improvements in production/manufacturing that would 
increase productivity (units per year for a given resource, workforce, etc.) and reduce costs. The framework for more 
specific technology assessment may follow the basic structure shown in Figure 17. 
 
The authors encourage and welcome feedback and ideas on technology candidates as well as a technology 
assessment framework. 
 
• Technology Assessment
Cost Component
Production Fixed Production Variable Integration Ops Fixed Ops Variable
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• Automated/standard launch 
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• Cellular manufacturing
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• Payload Integration/service 
level
• What does technology X do to this component of 
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(productivity) also co-related similarly
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technology community
 
Figure 17: Abundant technology options by phase represent potential areas of emphasis for NASA investment and for 
nanolaunchers pursuing low cost goals. 
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10. Preliminary Conclusions 
 
The nanolauncher assessment team was asked “to investigate the feasibility of dedicated nano-satellite launch 
systems with a recurring cost of less than $2 million per launch for a 5 kg payload to low Earth orbit. The team 
products would include potential concepts, technologies and factors for enabling the ambitious cost goal, exploring 
the nature of the goal itself, and informing the GCD program technology investment decision making process.” 
 
Preliminary conclusions of this study, addressing the study goals, include - 
 
 There is a limited experience base for this class of launch vehicles; further maturation of performance analysis 
and design tools is required 
 Dedicated nanolaunchers are estimated to cost 10s of $M per launch if following “business-as-usual” 
approaches 
 Launch vehicle scale reductions alone do not enable the goal of < $2M recurring launch cost 
 However- 
o Preliminary analysis shows that nanolauncher technology investments can significantly improve 
dedicated nanolauncher capabilities 
o The combination of technologies and efficient commercial approaches (new ways of doing business) 
can enable the goal of < $2M recurring launch cost 
 
Forward work as previously described will add more detail, supporting information, and address connections 
between specific technology, approaches or potential investments and their impacts on nanolaunchers. 
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